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Summary  findings
Economic efficiency has to do with how much wealth a  inefficient allocation. But they are usually easier to
given resource base can generate. Equity has to do with  implement and administer and require less information.
how that wealth is to be distributed in society. Economic  The extent to which water pricing methods can effect
efficiency gets far more attention, in part because equity  income redistribution is limited, the authors  conclude.
considerations involve value judgments that vary from  Disparities in farm income are mainly the result of
person to person.  factors such as farm size and location and soil quality,
Tsur and Dinar examine both the efficiency and the  but not water  (or other input) prices. Pricing schemes
equity of different methods of pricing irrigation water.  that do not involve quantity quotas cannot be used in
After describing water pricing practices in a number of  policies aimed at affecting income inequality.
countries, they evaluate their efficiency and equity.  The results somewhat support the view that water
In general they find that water use is most efficient  prices should not be used to effect income redistribution
when pricing affects the demand for water. The  because water prices are a poor vehicle for reducing
volumetric, output,  input, tiered, and two-part tariff  income inequality. But pricing schemes that involve
schemes all satisfy this condition and can be efficient,  water quota rules can reduce income inequality. The
although whether  efficiency is short-run or long-run,  authors demonstrate this with a two-rate tiered pricing
first- or second-best, varies.  scheme combined with equal quotas of the cheaper
Pricing schemes that do not directly influence water  water.
input - per-unit area fees, for example - lead to
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REFERENCES  371. Executive  Summary
The notion of economic efficiency is concerned  with the totality of wealth that can be
generated  by a given resource base.  Equity concepts,  on the other hand,  deal with how the
total  wealth  is to  be  distributed  among the  society's  members.  The  former receives  much
more attention,  as concept of Pareto Efficiencv  (i.e.,  an allocation from which it is impossible
to  depart  without  making  one  or  more  individuals  worse  off)  captures  center  stage  in
Neo-Classical  Economics.  One  reason,  perhaps,  is  that  distributional  aspects  entail
interpersonal comparisons which are inherently subjective (i.e.,  involve value judgment  which
varies from person to person depending on cultural,  traditional and other personal variations).
In  this  work  we  investigate efficiency  and  equity  performance  of  various  irrigation
water  pricing  methods.  We begin,  in  the  next  section,  with  a  summary of  water  pricing
practices  as applied  in a number of countries.  Section 3 defines efficiencv concepts  in the
context  of water pricing and evaluates the performance  of the different pricing methods in this
regard.  Section 4 discusses descriptive and normative income inequality measures.  Effects on
income  inequality  of  the  different  pricing  methods  are  identified  in  Section  5.  Section  6
concludes with a numerical example.
In general,  efficiency of water use is attainable  whenever the pricing method affects the
demand  for irrigation water.  The volumetric,  output,  input tiered and two-part tariff schemes
all satisfy  this  condition  and can achieve efficiency,  though  the type  of efficiency (short  or
long run,  first or second best) vary from one method  to the other.  These methods also differ
in  how  they  are  implemented  and  the  amount  and  type  of  information  needed  in  their
implementation.  Pricing schemes that do not  influence water input directlv,  such as per unit
area  fee,  lead  to  inefficient allocation.  Such  methods,  however,  are  in  general  easier  to
implement  and administer and they require a modest amount of information.
Concerning equity perfornance,  our (unfortunate)  conclusion is that the extent to which
water  pricing  methods  can  affect  income  redistribution  is  rather  limited.  Farm  income
disparities  are due mainly to such factors as farm size and location, and soil quality, but not to
water  (or  other  input)  prices.  We  find  that  when  farmers  are  per-hectare  identical  in
production  (i.e.,  vary only with farm size),  face the same prices,  and no quantity quotas are
applied,  the  income distribution profile under  most  water pricing methods is proportional  to
the  initial  farm  size  distribution  profile.  Since  measures  of  income  inequality  (with  the
exception of the variance) are not sensitive to proportional  shifts in  income. inequality is due
solely to the farm size inequality and is independent of the pricing method or water rates used.
Pricing  schemes that do not involve quantity  quotas cannot be used in policies aimed at
affecting  income  inequality.  This  includes  the  volumetric,  output,  input,  tiered,  and2
per-hectare  pricing  methods,  among others.  To  affect  income  inequality,  a  water  pricing
method should include certain forms of water quantity restrictions.
These results  lend some support to the view that income redistribution policies  should
not  be  carried  out  via water  prices (see,  e.g.,  Seagraves and  Easter,  1983);  not  because  it
involves  wrong  doing  but  because  water  prices  serve  as  a  poor  means  to  reduce  income
inequality.  However,  pricing  schemes  that  involve  water  quota  rules  can  reduce  income
inequality.  We demonstrate this with a two rate tiered  pricing  scheme combined  with equal
quotas of the cheaper water.
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2.  Practices  of Irrigation  Water  Pricing
2.1.  Costs  of  delivery  and  methods  of charge
Costs of irrigation  water supply consist of  variable costs of processing and delivering
the  water  to  end  users  and  of  fixed  cost  of  capital  operation  and  maintenance (O&M).
Variable  costs depend on the amount of water delivered,  while fixed costs do not.  In most
countries,  fixed costs are heavily subsidized (UN,  1980).
The method by which irrigation water is delivered affects the variable cost,  as well as
the  irrigation  technology  applied  and  the  feasible  pricing  schemes.  Water  may  flow
continuously  or in certain time  periods (in  which  case it may or  may not be delivered upon
demand);  the conveyance  system may consist  of  open  channels or  closed pipes.  Often,  the
irrigation  water  in  a  region is delivered by more  than  one  method,  depending on tradition,
physical conditions, and water facilities and institutions (UN,  1980).
Existing water pricing methods include (Rhodes and Sampath,  1988; Sampath, 1992):
Volumetric:  Water  is  charged  based  on  direct  measurement  of  volume  of  water
consumed.  Variation  of  the volumetric  approach  include  (1)  indirect  calculation based on
measurement  of minutes  of known flow  (as from  a reservoir)  or  minutes  of uncertain flow
(proportions of a flow of a river),  and (2) a charge for a given minimal volume to be paid for
even if not consumed.
Output: Irrigation  water is charged on per output basis (irrigators pay a certain water
fee for each unit of output they produce).
Input: Water  is charged by taxing inputs  (irrigators pay a water fee for each unit of a
certain input used).
Per unit area:  Water is charged per irrigated area, depending on the kind and extent of
crop  irrigated,  irrigation  method, the season of the year,  etc.  In many countries,  the water
rates are higher when there are storage works (investment)  than for diversions directly from
streams.  The rates for pumped water are usually higher than for water delivered by gravity.
In some cases, farmers are required to pay the per acre charges also for the unirrigated acres.4
Tiered Pricing: This  is a multi-rate volumetric  method,  in which  water rates vary as
the amount of water consumed exceeds certain threshold values.
Two  part  tariff:  Involves  charging  irrigators  a  constant  marginal  price  per  unit of
watef purchased (volumetric marginal cost pricing)  and a fixed annual (or admission) charge
for the right to purchase the water.  The admission charge  is the same for all farmers.  This
pricing method has been advocated, and practiced,  in situations where a public utility produces
with marginal cost below average cost and must cover total costs (variable and fixed).
Betterment levy: Water  fees are charged per unit area,  based on  the increase in land
value accruing from the provision of irrigation.
Water markets: In some developed economies,  markets for water or water rights have
been formed and determine water prices.
Bos  and  Walters  (1990)  investigated  farmers  representing  12.2  million hectares  (1
hectare  =  10 dunams  _  2.5  acres) of irrigated farms world wide and found that in more than
60%  of the cases,  water charges  are levied on  per unit area basis.  In less than 15% of the
irrigation projects,  water is charged based on a combination of per unit area and volumetric.
In about 25 % of the cases studied, the charging method is volumetric.
2.2. Pricing practices in developing countries
The information in this section has been collected based on many sources.  Some of the
information  may be  out  dated  both  in  terms  of price  levels,  and  in  terms of  water charge
system.
Armenia:  The Armenian irrigation system was designed to serve big collective farms.
It  is based mainly  on supply of surface water,  and is amended in some  places by tube wells
that are operated by individual farmers.  Presently,  energy cost for pumping irrigation water is
fully  subsidized.  The pricing  system  intends to  recover  O&M costs  by per  area  charges.
However in 1992, the collection rate of the water charges was only 27% (World Bank, 1994a).
China:  Most  Chinese  irrigation  facilities  are  publicly  owned.  Large  and  medium
irrigation  projects  are  managed  by  government  water  organizations.  Small  projects  are
generally  owned  by  local,  collective  farmers'  organizations.  Methods  used  to  charge  for5
irrigation consist of a combination of the per unit area,  output and a fixed capital and O&M
fee.  The rates vary across projects.  The irrigation water charge per hectare in rice dominant
Dujiangyan from 1940 through mid  1980s was 57-75 kg/hectare of husked rice plus 1/2 day of
labor provided annually for repairs and maintenance.  In the cotton dorminant irrigation area of
Jin-wei  in  the Shaanxi province,  since  1956 farmers  are charged  10.5  yuan  per  hectare for
their entire irrigable land plus 7.5  yuan for each hectare actually irrigated (2.67 yuan  =  $US1
in  1971).  Chinese irrigation water charges,  in general,  fall short of capital depreciation and
O&M expenses (Guohua,  1987).
Egypt:  Farmers  are  not  required  to  pay  for  irrigation  water.  They are  responsible,
however,  for the maintenance of the irrigation canals (mesqas) and ditches that are attached to
their fields (Arar,  1987).
India:  Irrigation  pricing  practices  vary  throughout  the  country,  depending  on
geographical locations, the command area of the project (region, state, country),  the system of
irrigation  (storage,  diversion,  pumped),  crops,  seasons, the nature  of agreement  (long lease,
short  lease),  and the procedure used  to extract penalties for unauthorized use (Gole,  Amble,
Chopra,  1977).  Some examples of pricing practices are (United Nations,  1980): (a) Per unit
area charges that vary from crop to crop and/or across seasons.  (b) Per unit area charges that
vary  according  to  the  method  of  irrigation  (flood,  ridges  and  furrows).  (c)  Per  unit area
charges agreed upon  for one or  more  years  (to  be  paid whether or  not  water is used).  (d)
Volumetric  rate per  estimated  volume  of  water  consumed,  applied  generally  in  areas with
pumped irrigation and tubewells (estimates are based on crop water requirements).  (e) Penalty
rates per  acre charged for use of  water in an unauthorized  manner or  for wasting water.  (f)
Percolation rates charged for each cultivated  acre within 200 yards of a canal which  receives
percolation or leakage water from the canal.  (g) A flat charge  per unit area covering all areas
serviced by the project,  whether or not actually irrigated during a given season or year.  (h) A
betterment  levy, applied  per  unit  area  served  by the project.  Water  charges  to  farmers in
Tamil Nadu in 1993 were 200-210 Rs/ha (In 1993, 31.5 RS =  $USI).  This rate is considered
to be amongst the highest water charges in India (World Bank, 1994c).
Indonesia: Farmers are not charged for the water they use, but they are responsible to
maintain and operate the tertiary-level  facilities (the part of the water conveyance facilities that
run through  their fields).  These activities  are administered by Water Users  Organizations or
by village governing bodies (Sampath,  1992).
Iraq: Per unit area charges are applied.  In 1983, rates were 1 Iraqi Dinar per  dunam
(IID  =  $US2.7;  1 dunam  =  0. 1 hectare) of  reclaimed  land which is  irrigated by  irrigation6
network  owned by the governrment  and  1/2 Dinar/dunam  of reclaimed land or orchard that is
irrigated by non-government means (Arar,  1987).
Jordan: The country faces a severe water scarcity.  Irrigation is the major user.  Crop
water  requirements  vary  substantially between  regions  due  to soil  and climatic conditions.
Upland  irrigation  is  based  mainly  on  ground  water  extraction.  Private  wells  are  not
monitored.  The cost of pumped  water  in  1993  is  estimated at  50  fills/m 3. In  the Jordan
Valley.  water is provided through pipes to  more than three quarters of the irrigated land.  A
volumetric  pricing  is used.  Water  is greatly  under  priced.  In the East Ghore canal  (Jordan
Valley  Irrigation  Project) farmers were charged  3 fils/m3 (1000 fils  =  1 Jordanian Dinar  =
$US2.85  in  1986) for the first  1.5 meter  of irrigation  depth and 6 fils/m 3 for any  additional
amount.  O&M costs  alone are estimated  at  20  to  30 filslm3 (Arar,  1987).  In  1993,  all
irrigation  water in the Jordan Valley were priced  at 6 fils per m3 (in 1993 1 Jordanian Dinar
$US1.5)  irrespective of volume used (Hayward  and Kumar,  1994).
Mexico:  Volumetric,  per  unit  area.  and  crop  and  tiered  methods  are  used.  The
Volumetric  method is used in 55 percent  of the irrigated land.  For each farmer,  water rates
vary with the total amount used as well as with  the crop grown.  In the other 45 percent of the
area,  the pricing method consists of a per unit  area rate that varies with the season, the crop,
the size of well from which water is pumped and the land tenancy structure (United Nations,
1980).
Moldova: Irrigation  in Moldova  is supplemental  in some years,  and used for drought
mitigation  in other years.  Irrigated area is about 220,000 ha  Currently, water charges are not
paid  by  the  agricultural  sector  and  the  irrigation  water delivery  cost  is  fully  paid  by  the
government  (Herman, 1995).
Morocco: Agriculture  uses  92 percent  of water  resources  in  Morocco.  Most  water
originates  in rainfall and snow melt that is harvested by big dams and delivered by a long canal
system.  Some areas have ground water supply to amend surface water.  Volumetric pricing is
mostly used, either measuring volume directly,  or via conversion of flow time.  Water rates do
not  cover the cost of water.  Rates differ based  on the region.  They range according to Arar
(1987)  between  Dh  0.22I/M 3 and  Dh  0.27/m3 (1  Dh  =  SUSO.113 in  1986).  Recent
information  (World Bank.  1994d) suggests that  rates range between Dh 0. 12/m3,  for gravity
irrigation  and Dh 0.33/m3, for Sprinkler irrigation (1 Dh = $USO.111 in 1993).
Nigeria:  Per area pricing is used.  River Basin authorities are empowered to charge (in
consultation  with  the government)  a  fee for  irrigation  water.  Each  River Basin  Authority7
decides on the appropriate rate.  In general the charges range between N15 - NIOO per hectare
of irrigated land (Ni  =  $1).  No charge is imposed on ground water (Akinola, 1987).
Pakistan:  Water  charges are on per  unit  area basis  and vary across provinces,  crops
and seasons.  Though water rates vary considerably  among ciops,  this variation is unrelated to
consumptive  crop  water  requirements or  income  generated  by  the  different  crops.  Water
charges depend  also on whether the flow of water  in the canal  is continuous or not.  In the
publicly  funded  project of SCARP (Salinity Control  and Reclamation project) water rates are
higher  than  in  privately  funded  areas.  In  the  present  system,  an  irrigation patwani  (an
assessor) assesses the water rates on the basis of crop conditions.  The assessor is a poorly paid
official  who  enjoys  a  considerable  power  within  his  area  of  jurisdiction,  typically
encompassing  4  or  5  villages.  The incentive  for  bribes  is apparent  (Chaudhry,  1987).  In
1981, the per acre water charges were Rs21.6/acre  for wheat, Rs32/acre for rice, Rs33.6/acre
for cotton and Rs6l.6/acre  for sugar cane (11.52 Rupee  =  $US1 in 1981, and 28.11 Rupee  =
$US1 in 1993).
Peru: Per unit area method is used which consists  of  national tariffs and local fees.
The  national  tariffs,  which  vary  across crops,  cover  the  costs of  administration and  O&M
provided  by the Ministry  of Agriculture through  its irrigation  districts.  Local fees are levied
by the local user associations to pay for their investments,  canal cleaning and flood protection
activities.  When water is plentiful it is supplied with no limitation.  When water is scarce and
highly variable,  it is distributed in the canals on a rotational basis (United Nations, 1980).  The
existing  legislation prescribes two types of water tariffs  (for agricultural and non-agricultural
uses),  but  neither  reflects  the  true cost  of  producing  the  water.  In  agriculture,  the tariff
includes  three  components:  (1) a  water user association  component to  meet O&M expenses,
(2)  A  water  levy component,  and  (3) an  amortization  component  to  recover cost  of public
investment, mainly storage (World Bank, 1995)
Philippines:  A uniformn  rate of P12/hectare/year  was collected  from  all water  users
until  1964 (1 P  =  $USO.05 in  1980).  The  National  Irrigation  Administration increased the
charges and adopted a dual pricing scheme in 1966 at a rate P25/hectare in the wet season and
P35/hectare  in  the  dry  season.  Non-rice  and  corn  lands  paid  P20/hectare.  In  1975,  the
pricing  method  was  changed to  output/area  basis  with  the  rates  of  100 kg/hectare  in  wet
seasons and  150kg/hectare in dry seasons.  A higher  rate  of  175 kg/hectare was collected in
irrigation  projects  located  in  Central  and  Northern  Luzon  and  Mindoro  to  offset  regional
disparities  in  irrigation  service.  Additional  water  rights  fees  per  volume  of  water  were
introduced in 1976 by the National Water Resources  Council (an autonomous agency in charge
of the management  of all water resources in the country).  These rates change progressively
with the amount of water used (Cruz et al.,  1987).8
Zimbabwe:  Water  charges  are mostly  on  a  per  unit area  basis,  and  vary  with  crop
according  to crop return.  A revised payment scheme,  instituted in 1986, consists of a uniform
rate  designed  to  secure water supply  and crop  gross  margins.  A latest proposal  is to  base
water  charges  on  average net profitability  of the  two  major  crops in  the country (Mudimu,
1987).
2.3.  Pricing practices in developed countries
Australia:  The price of public irrigation water has generally been set to cover, on an
average  cost  basis,  only  part of annual servicing  (maintenance and operation)  costs and has
often excluded  completely the cost of capital.  Two  water market experiments in transferring
irrigation  rights  were  undertaken on  a  trial  basis.  In  New South Wales,  the annual water
entitlements  were recently made transferable for  a  one year  trial.  In  South Australia,  water
rights have been transferable (saleable) in private irrigation areas (OECD, 1987).
California (USA): Multi-rate Volumetric pricing of publicly supplied water is common
(depending on the irrigation district) . Prices range between $2/Acre- Foot (AF) to more than
$200/AF  (1 AF  =  1256 in3).  On average,  farmers  paid  about $5/AF  for  federal  Central
Valley  Project  water during  1988, compared  with  $48/AF  average capital depreciation  c;ost
and  $325/AF  average  marginal cost  of  delivery  (Rao,  1988).  Cummings and  Nercissiantz
(1992) estimnated  average water price at $19.32/AF,  which they claimed covers a mere 39 per
cent of the estimated scarcity value (the in situ  value of groundwater).  The recent prolonged
drought  in California has led to the development of innovative water banks and water markets
through which water prices are determined (see Easter and Tsur,  1992).
Canada:  Per area pricing is common.  In Alberta,  farmers pay a one-time charge of up
to $50/acre  to cover capital costs, and an annual charge of $1.50 to $10.00 per acre to cover
some operating  expenses.  These amount to about  14 percent  of the cost  of capital and other
operating expenses (OECD, 1987).
England and Wales: Multi-rate volumetric pricing is common.  Water authorities vary
greatly  in the sophistication of their charging  systems.  For  example,  in 1984/5,  the Wessex
Water  Authority  had 9 rates of charge and  the Yorkshire  Water Authority 45 rates (OECD,
1987).
France:  Irrigation  water  is  commonly  priced  by  a  two-part  tariff  method,  which
consists  of a combination  of a volumetric and  a flat rate.  In  1970, the societe du  Canal de9
Provence  et  d'Amenagement  de  la  Region  Provencal,  which  supplies  60,000  hectares  of
farmland and nearly  120 communes, introduced a pricing scheme in which rates vary between
peak demand and off-peak periods.  The  peak period rate is set to cover Long-run capital and
operating costs.  The off- peak rate is set to cover only the operating costs of water delivery.
About 50 percent  of total supply costs (variable and fixed) are subsidized by the state (OECD,
1987).
Greece:  Per  area  charges  are  common.  The  proceeds  usually  cover  onlv  the
administrative  costs of the irrigation  network. The irrigation  projects are categorized  as basic,
local and private importance and the project areas are also classified as areas of national,
public or private interest.  The parts of the capital (development)  costs of an irrigation  project
paid by farmers are 30%, 50%, and 40% for project classified as national, public and private
interest, respectively  (Gole et al., 1977).
Israel: A multi-rate volumetric  method  coupled with quantity  regulation  is used to price
publicly  supplied water.  Farmers  entitlements for  water quantities at the different rates vary
from year to year based on precipitation. Water rates are the same for all, which means that
farmers in the rainy north pay above supply cost while farmer in the dry south pay below it.
Water rates cover only a small part of capital  depreciation (Tahal, 1993).
The pricing methods discussed above and their characteristics are summarized  in  Table 1
below.10
Table  1: Summary  of Irrigation  Pricing  Practices  in Selected  Countries
Basis of Water Charging  Cost Recovey  Remarks
Country
Volure  Area  Others  O&M  Capital
I.  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
China  Yes  vary with crop.  pardy  No  Paid in
output/hectare  +
labor  conrributon.




India  Yes  Yes  pardy  pardy  wide divergence in
vary widt crop and season.  mediods  of charging
(Ground  Wallr)  across the country.
Indonesia  No  No  No charges;
responsible  for
O&M  of ternary
channels.
Iraq  Yes  Government  owned
sytenis  charge  twice
the rate of non-
governnentl
systemis.
Jordan  Yes  pardy  No  Water supplied  on
demand.
Mexico  Yes  Yes  pardy  No  Many different
Combination of volumetric  and area;  sophisdcated  pricing
vary widh  season & crop.  methods  practiced
across  the  country.
Morocco  Yes  mostly  partly
Nigeria  Yes  partly  No
Pakistan  Yes  pardlyl
Pakistan  Yes  vary with crop, perennial  flow,  l
goverrnent  or private project.;
Table 1: Sununary of Irrigation Pricing Practices in Selected  Countries  (Cont'd)
Basis of Water Charging  Cost Recovey  Remarks
Country  l
Volune  Area  Others  O & M  Capital
Peru  Yes  partly  partly  Water is charged
only in scarcity
regions.
Phillipines  Yes  vary with season & crop.  partly  N.  A.  Addinrional  Water
rights fee charged.
Zimbabwe  l  Yes  partly  No  New unifborm
charges  based  on
l  crop profitability
levied.
H.  DEVELOPED  COUNTRIES
Canada  Yes  pardy  partly
Yes  A variey of pricing  systems.  pardy  pardy
England  & Wales
France  Yes  Yes  A combiration of volumemic  and area  partly  pardy  Peak and off-peak
based.  raes are used.
California.  Yes  vary  with  topography,  ownership,  partly  pardy  Water enddement
extent of subsidy.  valy with preci-
U.S.A.  pitaton; water
nmarkets  begin  to
emerge.
Israel  Yes  Tier pricing; penalty for excess  use.  pardy  pardy  Ninenty percent of
irription  uses




3.  Efficiency Performance of Pricing Methods
3.1.  Efficiency  concepts
An efficient allocation of water resources  (or any other resource) is an allocation  that
maximizes the total net benefit that can be generated by the  available quantity of the rcsource.
If the net benefit to be maximized involves only  variable costs and abstracts from (imputed)
annual capital  and other fixed costs,  the efficiency  is that of a short run.  In the absence of
taxes or other distortionary constraints, an efficient  allocation is first-best (or Pareto efficient).
In the presence of distortionary constraints.  an allocation that maximizes the total net benefit
under  the constraints is called second-best efficient  (see Baumol and Bradford,  1970).  Such is
the situation,  for example, when taxes exist that distort input output decisions.  In this section
we discuss the performance of the above listed pricing schemes vis-a-vis efficiency criteria.
3.2.  General setup
Let  there  be  n  farmers,  indexed  i =  1,2,. . .,n,  that  extract/divert  water  from  the
irrigation  project  (or  any  source of  water).  Let  Li denote  land endowment  (farm  size)  of
farmer i measured, say, in hectare (ha).  Let q and x denote respectively per hectare water and
other  (possibly  more  than one)  inputs  of  production.  Let  gi(x,q)  represent  farmer  i's  per
hectare  production  function,  indicating  the  maximum  output  that can  be  produced  for  any
feasible choice of inputs x and q.
Let p  represent output price and  r  be  the price  of x.  Water  charges can  be applied
directly,  i.e.,  per  unit  of water  used  (volumetric),  or  indirectly on  a  per  output,  input  or
hectare  basis.  Accordingly,  let  zw, zg,  z'  and  za  represent  the  water  fees  charged  per
volumetric unit of water, unit of output,  unit of input and on a per hectare basis,  respectively.
Let z  =  (zw,z ,zx)
The operating profits are
Yi  =  (p-zg)gi(x,q)  - zwq  - (r+zX)x - za,  i= 1,2,...,n.  (3.1)
Profit  seeking farmers choose  q  and  x  to  maximize yi,  the necessary conditions  for
which are13
(p-Z 5)gj,(xj (z),qj*(z)) - (r+zx)  = 0  (3.2a)
and
(p-zg)gjq(xj*(z),qj*(z))  - =  0  (3.2b)
where gi  =_  agilfx, giq  - &g,/lq,  p-z' >0,  and p,r are suppressed  as arguments  of x  and
q  for convenience.  The solutions qi*(z) and xj*(z) of (3.2), when feasible, are the input
demand functions, which when substituted back in (3.1) give the per- hectare indirect profit
functions
yi(Z,Za)  = (p-z )gj(xj*(z),qj*(z))  - zwq,*(z)  - (r+zx)xi*(z) - z  (3.3)
So far,  we have considered the case of  a  single crop.  Often farmers can  switch
between a few crops, each with its specific production function and water requirement.  In
such cases, let the subscript  j =0,1,2,.. .,m indicate the corresponding  function  for crop j, with
j=0  signifying unirrigated farming. Accordingly, gij(x,q) is farmer's i per-hectare  production
function for crop j,  xij and qij are the per-hectare inputs demanded  by farmer i for crop j,
(zj,zja)  (zjw,zjgzjSx  zj) represent  water fees for crop j, and yij  are the per- hectare  profits.
In addition  to input/output  choices for each crop, farmers must also decide on the mix
of crops to grow.  Avoiding such considerations  as crop rotation, constrained  regulations  on x
and  q,  or  yield  and  price  uncertainties,  at  any  given  water  prices  configuration
(z,za)  =zj',zjl,zjx,zj',  j=0,1,2,...,m},  each  farmer  will  grow  only one  crop:  the crop  that
yields the highest per-hectare  profit.  Farmer i's crop decision, thus, can be represented  by the
indicator function
I  ( Z,Za)  if{y,(z,z)w  >  yk(z,z')fora1lk  a  j
O otherwise
(ties are determined  arbitrarily).  That is,  Ijj=1 if farmer i chooses crop j  and Ijj=O
otherwise.  Farmer i's per-hectare  input demands, output and profit are:14
m




Other inputs: xi*  (z,z )  5  E  lij(Z,Za)Xij;(Z,Za)
j=O




Profit:  yi(z,za)  =  EIij(Z,Za)Yij(Z,Za).
j-0
The aggregate  water demand  of all farmers is
n
Q(z,Z  a)  i  Liq(z za).  (3.4)
i=I
A change  in z  =  {zjw,zjg,zjx,  j =1,  2,...,  m} affects water demand in two ways.  First,
it changes the per-hectare water demand functions--the  qIj(z,z")'s.  Second, it affects the crop
choice--the  Iij(z,za)'s.  For  example,  raising  water  price  zjw for  all  crops  j  will  decrease
q 1j (z,za)  for all crops, and may lead to some farmers switching  from water intensive  crops to
water saving crops.
A change in  the per-hectare water fees, zja, j=0,1,2,...,ni,  has no effect on the
per-hectare water demands of each crop, but it can affect the crop choice.  For example,
raising zla relative to z,a may lead to some farmers switching from crop 1 to 2.  An extreme
case occurs when large zja, j=1,2,...n,m,  relative to  zoa causes some farmers to switch to
dryland farming or to retire farmland  from production altogether.15
On the water supply side, let C(Q) represent the cost of supplying  Q m3 of irrigation
water at a given time period (a year, say), so that C'(Q) = 'C/dQ is  the MC of water supply.
The short run water supply may be constrained  (due to water scarcity or a capacity  limit on the
conveyance  system or both), so that Q < Q
The overall benefit (B) associated with supplying Q  m 3 of  water at a fee structure
(Z,  Z,,Z,,Za  )(Z,Za)  is
n  ni




B(z) =  L  Lj[pgj(xj 1(z),q *(z))  - rxi*(z)] - C(Q(z)).  (3.5)
i=1
For clarity of exposition  we maintain  the single crop case, unless otherwise  indicated.
3.3. Volumetric  pricing
In this method z==z  =z  =O  and water is priced directly via zw. A volumetric  pricing
policy in which the price of water is set at the marginal cost (MC) of water supply (i.e., the
cost of processing  and delivering the last water unit)  is called marginal cost pricing.  Such a
policy achieves first best efficiency.
To see this note that the necessary condition for maximizing the benefit (3.5) with
respect to zw  is
n
L[pgiq(xi*(zw),qj*(zw))  - CD(Q(zw))]  q*  (zw) =  0  (3.6)
i=l16
provided  Q(zw) does  not  exceed  the  capacity  limit  Q.  But,  from  (3.2),
pgiq(xi  (Zw),q%  (zw))  =  z'  for all i, hence (3.5) implies zw  = C'(Q(zw)),  which is the marginal
cost pricing rule.  The marginal cost pricing policy, thus, leads to an efficient allocation  (the
sufficient  condition is satisfied  when the gi's are concave  in x,q and C is convex).
A departure from marginal cost pricing may be required if the objective (3.4) is to be
maximized subject to additional constraints.  Such constraints  may, for example, require that
the proceeds from selling the water should cover also capital depreciation and other fixed
costs.  Volumetric  pricing in this situation  can achieve  second  best efficiency.
3.4.  Output and input pricing
The output method corresponds to the case where zW, z'  and za  vanish and only zg is
used.  The output fee that maximizes the benefit (3.5), if it exists, must satisfy the first order
condition
n
Li(pgi.(xi  ,qi*)-r)xi*' - C'(Q)q  ]  =  0
i=l
which. using (3.2), can be written as
n
Z  gi.(xi ,qi*)xi*'  - CF(Q)qi*']  =  0  (3.7)
i=l
where xi*'  =_  axi* 8 *  g, qi*' =_  aqIazg.
In general there may not exist a fee zg e [O,p) that satisfies (3.7).  However, when
farmers are per-hectare identical, i.e.,  g,(x,q) = g(x,q) for all i=1,2,...,n,  a feasible e  that
satisfies (3.7) may exit.  This is the case, for example, when g(x,q) is increasing  and strictly
concave in q and x,  and gqx  =-  8g(x,q)/eqox  >  0.  To see this note that when per-hectare
input demands  are identical  across farmers, (3.7) can be written as
zgg,(x*,q*)x*'  - C'(Q)q*'  =  0.  (3.8)17
Now, both q*' - aq /az'  and  x*'  3  ax*/g  are  negative when g(q,x)  is  strictly
concave,  gqx  > O  and  p > zg.  Assuming  C'(Q) > O  and  noting  from  (3.2)  that
gx(x,q ) =  r/(p-z'), we conclude  that, provided p <  1 + rx'/(C'(Q)q'),
Z9 =  p  (3.9)
1 + rx*  '/(C' (Q)  q')
satisfies (3.8) and is the optimal  fee level.
However, this is a second best efficiency, because the output fee and the zero price of
water may distort input/output  decisions.  The outcome attained  under output pricing, thus, is
likely to fall short of that under marginal cost pricing.
1 To see this, total differentiate  the first order conditions (3.2a-b) with respect to zg, setting
zw=zx=O and using gq=0 and gx=r/(p-zg), to obtain
XXX*' +  gxqq*' =  r/(p-z )2 and  gxqxx  '  +  gqqq  '  =  0,
or, written compactly,
Cgx  gxq)x  (r/  =  p - )-
gqx  gqq  q 
Applying Cramer rule yields
x  de  tr  /(P  -Zg Y  gxq  / det g  xx  g  xq  and q tdet  g  xx  r/(p-  z)'  )/det  gx  gq)
0  gqq  gqx  gqq  gqx  °  gqx  gqq
The strict concavity of g ensures that the denominator is positive, and gqq<O,  gqx >0,  and
p-z' > 0 imply that the numerators  are both negative.18
Moreover,  the restrictions  needed to  achieve the second best efficiency (identical  per
hectare production technologies gi across farmers  and complimentarity relation between water
and another  input of production) are avoided  by the marginal cost pricing rule when water is
priced directly.
It should be noted, however, that the benefit  measure B abstracts from agency cost and
the cost of collecting information associated with implementing the water pricing policies.  The
advantage  of  output pricing  is that  it does  away  with  the  need to  measure water  inputs  of
individual  farmers,  which in many developing  countries  is an expensive (or even impossible)
task.  Output, on the other hand, is easier to measure.
In  the input pricing method,  zw, zg and  za  are set equal to zero and only zx is used.
With  a few obvious modifications, the analysis  of this case follows that of the output pricing
method.  As  in the previous  case, the benefit  under  input pricing policy is smaller than that
under  marginal cost pricing.  The performance  of the input pricing method relative to that of
the output pricing varies from case to case, depending on the production technology g(x,q).
3.5.  Per area pricing
Here zw, zg and z'  vanish and only za  is used:  Farmers  pay a fixed fee per hectare for
the right to receive irrigation water; once this  fee is paid, water is supplied upon request,  free
of charge.  In the single crop case, the per hectare  input demands are independent of the fee za
and  water  demand exceeds that  under  volumetric  pricing  for  any  positive water price  zw.
Thus,  the demand for irrigation water is larger  than that under the marginal cost pricing  rule
and the resulting allocation is inefficient.
Yet  this  scheme is easy  to  administer  and,  unlike  the  volumetric method,  does  not
require  the water conveyance facilities to be metered.  Moreover,  in the multiple crop case,  it
is possible to influence water demand directly by differential fee schemes, in which per-hectare
fees vary from crop to crop,  that affect farmers'  crop  choice.  Under certain circumstances  in
the multiple crop case, farmers may select only one crop of the possible set, or a mix of crops.
Factors  affecting this  choice  may  be  behavioral--level  of  risk  aversion  of  the  farmer,  or
technical--availability  of and substitution between  factors of production other than water.19
3.6.  Additional pricing methods
Tiered  pricing: This pricing  method  is common  when water demand has periodical
(seasonal,  daily)  variations  and  water  supply  is  insufficient  to  meet demand  at all  times.
During  low  demand  periods,  when supply  exceeds  demand,  the  marginal  cost pricing  rule
achieves  (short-run)  efficiency (see the discussion  of the volumetric method above).  During
peak  demand  periods,  supply  is  insufficient  to  meet  demand  and  the  constraint  Q '  Q  is
binding.  The  water  price  then  should  account  for  water  scarcity  and  is  increased  by  the
shadow  price  of  this  constraint.  Formally,  the  problem  is  to  maximize  (3.5)  subject  to
Q(zw) <  Q.  The Lagrangian is
L(zw)  ZL[pgi(x,*(zw),qi*(zw))  - rxi*(zw)]  - C(Q(zw)) - Ji(Q(zw) - -Q
and the necessary condition (3.6), when z* is substituted for pgqi(qi(zw*)),  changes to
n
_Li[zw {Cf(Q(zw))+  t}]q(zW)  =  0,  2 0,  Q(zw)- Q  0,  -(Q(zw)-  Q  0
i=l
During  low demand periods,  the water supply  constraint  is not binding, i.e.,  Q(zw) -
Q <0,  so that  t=0  and water is priced at the marginal  cost.  During peak demand periods,
when the water constraint is binding, pt >  0 and water is priced above marginal cost.  Such a
tiered  pricing  scheme is a straightforward  extension  of  the single rate marginal cost  pricing
rule to cases of periodic changes in water demand or water supply or both.
Another  tiered  pricing  method  sets  the  price  $zl/m3 for  the  first  Q, m3 of  water
supplied,  $Z2/m 3 (Z2 > ZI)  for the next Q2 mi 3 ,  $z3/m3 (z3 > z2) for the following Q3 m3 and so
on.  If the different  water rates are set along the marginal  supply curve, it can be shown that
this  method  amounts  to  discriminating  water  prices  in  favor  of  irrigators  (i.e.,  water
consumers).  The water supply agency is thus striped of some of its operating profits that could
be  gained  under  a  single-rate-marginal-pricing  policy.  For  short  run  efficiency,  this
reallocation  of  income has no  impact on the  overall  benefit.  In the  long run,  the reduced
profits  of  the water  supplier may be  insufficient  to  cover  capital  and other fixed costs  and
long-run considerations have to be incorporated.20
Two part tariff: By introducing the admission fixed charge that serves to balance the
budget  of the water  supply agency,  this method  extends  the short run  marginal cost pricing
rule to  account  for  long  run  fixed costs considerations.  The  implementation of  the annual
admission charge as a Pigouvian poll tax avoids the distortionary  effects of other taxing forms.
The two  part tariff  method has therefore  been considered  as capable of  achieving long run
efficiency (see Feldstein [1972a-b], and Laffont and Tirole [1993, pp. 19-34]).
Water markets: The basic premise of modem economics  is that markets, under certain
conditions,  achieve  first-best  efficiency.  These  "certain  conditions"  include  competitive
environment  (no  single  agent  can  affect  outcomes),  fully  informed  agents operating  under
certainty,  no externalities,  and no increasing  returns  to  scale  in production.  In  the case of
water,  these conditions  are frequently violated.  Water is expensive to transport,  hence water
markets  tend to  be localized,  consisting of a  limited  number  of participants,  some of whom
may be able to influence outcomes.  Water supply is in many cases uncertain.  Water resources
(e.g.,  aquifers)  may be  shared  by  many users  that  inflict externalities  on each other  (e.g.,
groundwater  pumping  of one farmer  reduces the water level  and increases pumping costs to
other  farmers).  Water  supply  systems,  like  other  public  utilities,  may exhibit  increasing
returns  to scale.  For  these reasons, water markets  are unlikely  to attain a first-best efficient
allocation.
Yet,  even when distorted, the sub-optimal outcomes of water markets may outperform
the other pricing methods when administration,  implementation and information costs are taken
into consideration.  So far,  all the pricing methods discussed are operated via some kind of a
central (national, regional,  district,  village) water agency.  Such an operation is costly both in
terms of administering  it and in terms of the information it requires (e.g.,  regulators may need
data on  farmers production  technologies,  inputs  and outputs).  Water markets do away with
these agency (or transaction) costs, thus may, on the whole, achieve a better outcome then any
of the other pricing methods.  Water markets are only recently beginning to emerge and more
experience is needed to assess their performance compared to centralized mechanisms.
3.7.  Summary of the efficiency analysis
A  volumetric  scheme  that  uses  the  marginal  cost  pricing  rule  achieves,  when
information is costless,  first-best (the maximum attainable total benefit) efficiency in the short
run.  The output and  input pricing  methods can achieve  second best efficiency in the short
run,  as the output/input  taxes may distort output/input  decisions;  they are,  however,  easy to
implement and do not  require data on water used by farmers.  The tiered pricing method can
achieve first best efficiency in the short run,  and  a two part  tariff scheme can achieve that in
the long run.  Per area pricing can affect water input through  its effect on crop choices but is21
inefficient,  since once the crop has been chosen,  the water fee has no effect on water demand.
It  is however  easy  to  implement  and  administer  and  requires  minimal  information.  WVater
markets achieve first best efficiency when properly operated.  When distorted they may still be
desirable  when  agency  (monitoring,  implementing,  data  collecting)  costs  are  taken  into
account.
Table  2: Comparison of key variables of various pricing methods
Pricing Scheme  Implementation  Efficiency  Time Horizon of  Ability to
Achieved  Efficiency  Control Demand
Volumetric  Complicated  First-best  Short-run  Easy
Output  Relatively easy  Second-best  Short-run  Relatively easy
Input  Easy  Second-best  Short-run  Elatively easy
Per area  Easiest  None  N/A  Hard
Tiered  Relatively  First-best  Short-run  Relatively easy
complicated
Two part  Relatively  First-best  Long-run  Relatively easy
complicated
Water Market  Difficult  First-best  Short-run  N/A
without  pre-estableshed
institutions4.  Equity Measures
Equity is a vague concept that changes colors,  shapes and meanings depending on the
particular  object according to which it is measured (opportunities, needs,  incomes, utilities).  It
has  therefore  been  pushed  aside  from  mainstream  economics  (and  its  associated  policy
prescriptions),  overshadowed by less subjective efficiency concepts.  Yet, it appears reasonable
to  require that policies aimed at allocating  publicly  owned natural resources  will not eschew
equity considerations altogether.  How then are such considerations to be incorporated within
water  allocation policies'? To  address  this question,  we  begin with a brief primer  (based on
Sen,  1973) of economic inequality  concepts and  their  measurements.  We then discuss how
these concepts can be  used to evaluate equity  consequences of departure  from  marginal cost
pricing towards the other pricing schemes discussed above.
Inequality  measures  can  be  either  descriptive  or  normative.  Descriptive  measures
simply evaluate the dispersion of the income profile by means of some  descriptive statistic.
Normative measures are derived from some underlying social welfare function.
4.1. Descriptive  measures  of income inequality
A widely used measure of dispersion is the variance
1  n
V  (yi_jt) 2 ,  (4.1)
n  i=1
n
where  p  =  E  y 1/n  is mean  income.  V equals zero when income  is equally divided,
n
and it attains the level (n-1)p? under  maximum inequality, when the entire income  E  y, goes
to one person and the other members  get zero  income.  A weakness of V is its sensitivity to
relative  shifts  in  income:  an  income  profile  y'  =  ,y  for  some  scalar  ,B has  a  variance
V'  =  f3 2V.  Thus,  an  income profile  that grows  proportionally  over time  is considered  less
unequal at early stages of growth, when incomes are low, then at later stages when the society
is richer.
The coefficient of variation23
c=  ai  /M
avoids this  property.  C possesses the  undesirable  property of assigning the same  impact to
income transfers  between rich-poor  pairs  with  the same income disparity,  regardless of their
actual income level (e.g.,,  the change in C as a result of a transfer from a person with income
10 to a person with income 1 is the same as a transfer from a person with income  1000 to one
with income 991).
A measure  that does away with  this  property  is the standard deviation of  logarithms
defined,  for y  >  0, as
H  =  (i(logy  IlogU)  . (4.3)
A related  index was proposed  by  Theil  (1967),  drawine on  the  idea of  entropy  in
information theory.  When normalized to lie between zero and unity, Theil's  entropy index has
the form
T  g  Ylog()  (4.4)
n,plog(n)  ~=j  A
Another  inequality  measure  that  uses  income/mean  ratios  is  Atkinson's  (1970)
Cobb-Douglas index
A,=I  t  (y  .n  (4  .5)
All the above measures involve income  comparisons relative to the mean,  which may
seem  somewhat  arbitrary.  The  Gini  coefficient,  on  the  other hand,  involves  comparison
between all income pairs.  Ordering  incomes so that y1 I  y 2 >  2 ...  > y,  the Gini coefficient,
normalized to lie between zero and unity, takes the following equivalent forms:24
I  n  n
G=  -I  E  Iyi-yj
2 n  fl7p  j=1
nn
=  1-  I  E  Min{yi,yj}
n  7  j=1  =
2  n
1  +  1/n-  2  i  Yi  (4.6)
n  /1
Despite the limitations (mentioned above)  of some of the indexes, they all satisfy  two
important  properties:  (a) renaming members  does  not change the inequality measure (this has
been referred to as the symmetry or anonymity property);  and (b) an income transfer from rich
to poor,  everything else remains the same, decreases  the inequality measure.
Ranking Income Profiles Based on the Descriptive  Measures: Any two income profiles,
say y'  and y2, can be ranked according to any of the above indexes: For  I=V,C,H,T,A  or G,
I(y1)  >,  <  or  =  I(y 2)  > {yl is more,  less or equally unequal as y2}.
In  principle,  then,  any  such  descriptive  index  provides  a  complete  ranking  of  all
possible income profiles.
There are two basic limitations in using  descriptive measures to rank income profiles.
First,  the different measures may contradict each other,  in which case ranking depends on the
chosen  index.  This  problem is technical  in  narure  and can be  mitigated to  some extent  by
considering  ranking according to the interaction  of some or  all of the indexes; e.g.,  y'  is at
least  as  egalitarian  as  y  (or  y'  does  not  exhibit  more  income  inequality  than  y )  if
T(y')  s  T(y2) and A(y1) s A(y2) and G(yl)  s  G(y2).  When two indexes contradict each other
for some income profile pairs, these pairs cannot  be ranked according to the interaction index
(see  example  in  Atkinson,  1970).  In  technical  terms,  interaction  of  indexes  generates  a
quasi-ordering.  This may not be considered a drawback,  Sen (1973) argues, as completeness
may be too much to ask.25
Indeed,  the widely used inequality ordering rule based on Lorenz curves is incomplete.
Under the Lorenz  ordering rule,  y 1 is more  (less) egalitarian than y 2 if its Lorenz curve lies
completely above (below) that of y2;  the two are considered equally egalitarian if their Lorenz
curves  coincide.  When  the Lorenz  curves  of  y'  and  y2 intersect,  the two  income profiles
cannot be compared.
The  second  limitation of using descriptive  measures  to  rank  income profiles  is more
substantial: With the exception of V, descriptive indexes pay no attention to the total income to
be allocated.  Thus, an income profile y'  which  is twice  as large as y'  (y2 =  0.5v ) would be
ranked as equal by all measures except for V which would rank V  above y'.  Yet, when asked
to  choose  between the two profiles,  a reasonable  person  would surly prefer y'  I  ver y 2 (each
member under  y1 receives a  higher income than his counterpart under y2).  And a reasonable
person would still prefer y 1 over y2 even when yv is slightly less egalitarian than y  but its total
income is substantially larger than that of  y
2 . Moreover,  often the  size of the pie (the total
income) is not  independent of the rule according  to which the pie is divided, as division rules
affect production decisions.
Though  descriptive  measures contain  important  distributional  information,  it appears
that their limitation is due mainly  to their inability  to account for inequality vs.  total income
tradeoffs.  This limitation motivates the consideration of normative measures of inequality.
4.2.  Normative  measures  of income inequality
The  social  welfare function:  Underlying  all  normative  indexes  is  a  group  welfare
function  W(U1(y1),U2(y2),...,Un(yn))  defined over  the n  member utilities Ui,  which assign a
welfare level to any income profile y through the utility members derived from their incomes.
(Such group  welfare functions escape Arrow's  impossibility  verdict and become possible by
considering cardinal  individual utilities and allowing  for  interpersonal comparison of utilities;
see,  Sen,  1973,  Chapter  1,  and  Deaton  and  Muellbauer,  1980,  Chapter  9).  To  respect
individual preferences,  W should be increasing in the Ui's.  As the individual utilities may be
unknown,  it is often more convenient to define the group welfare function directly in terms of
the income profile y, in which case W(y) is used to represent welfare.
Group welfare functions are required to be Symmetric (or anonymous), quasi- concave
and  to  be  increasing  in  the  yi' s.  Symmetry  ensures  that  renaming  members  leaves  W
unchanged  (the n members are equally important);  quasi-concavity implies that a transfer from
rich to  poor does  not decrease W,  hence is biased  towards  egalitarian distributions (Dalton,
1920, was the first  to  require that the group welfare  function should possess this property).26
Often,  homotheticity  is also imposed (W  is homothetic  if it can be expressed as a monotone
transformation of a linear homogeneous function).
Normative  measures  of inequality.  Given  a  group  welfare  function W(y),  define the
equally-distributed  equivalent  income  y,  as the  per  capita  income  that  when  shared  by all
members would generate the same welfare level as that derived from the actual income profile
(Sen,  1973,  p.  42).  That  is,  y,  satisfies W(yS,yS,...  ,yS) =  W(y1,y2,...,yn).  Since W  is
quasi-concave  and  symmetric,  the  indifference  curves  are  convex  towards  the  origin  and
y  < ,u.  Sen's (1973, p.  42) normative inequality measure is defined as
N  =  1- (y,4t).  (4.7)
n
Under  utilitarian  welfare,  when  W  =  JU&(y 1 ),  N  is  the  same  as  the  measure
proposed by Atkinson (1970).  If,  in addition,  Uj(yj) =  y 1 for all i, then y,  =  1 and N =  0 for
all income profiles.  Indeed, a group welfare function that is concerned with total income only,
is the same as the efficiency criterion and is free of any distributional content.27
5.  Equity  Performance  of Some  Water Pricing  Methods
We consider a group of farmers identical in all respects except for their land endowment Li.
n
Let L  =  I  L  denote total land and Xi =  Li/L be the share of total land owned by farmer i;
n
Xi  > 0 and  =  1.  Let X =  (Xi,X 2,.  Xn)  be the land distribution  profile.  We now look at
,=,
the group  income profiles under  the different  pricing  schemes,  compare  their corresponding
inequality measures and discuss how they perform on the efficiency scale.
5.1. Volumetric  pricing
Here farmers pay $zw for each m 3 applied for irrigation.  So long as all face the same
water price zw, each farmer demands q(zW)  m3/hectare and obtains the profit y(zw) (cf.  (3.1)
and (3.2)).  Farmer i's  income is y(zw)Li =  y(zW)LXi,  and the group income profile is given by
y(zw)LX.  It follows that z'  affects  the income profile through  the per  hectare income y(zw),
which  is  common to  all  farmers.  Using the  definitions  of  C,  H,  T,  A and  G (cf.  Eqs.
(4.2)-(4.6)),  it is seen that they are all independent of proportional shifts in the income profile,
hence they are independent of z'.  Income inequality,  in this  case,  is due  solely to  the land
endowment profile X.
5.2. Per unit area pricing
Here  farmers pay  a fixed fee of $za for each  irrigated hectare.  Assume that this fee
does  not  lead  to  retiring  land  from  production,  so  that  the  land  distribution  X remains
unchanged.  Irrigation  water  will  be  applied  up  to  the level  where  its  value  of  marginal
productivity vanishes, yielding the same net per hectare income of y(O)_Za for all farmers.  The
resulting  income profile  is  [y(O)_Za  ]LX.  As  in  the case of  volumetric  pricing,  the  income
profile  is proportional to the land profile LX =  (L1,L2.....  L,), hence the descriptive inequality
measures C, H, T,  A and G are independent of the per hectare fee za and income inequality is
completely determined by land endowment inequality.
This result holds also in the multiple crop case. as the identical farmers will choose the
same crop.'8
5.3.  Output  pricing
Here  $z  is paid (as a water  fee) for each  output unit.  The input decision problem is
slightly altered.  Let g(x.w) be the output obtained using water input  w and other inputs x (see
footnote  1).  Let p and r represent the output price and the price of x,  respectively.  The per
hectare input decisions entail finding the w and x levels that maximize y  = (p-zg)g(x,w)-rx.
Out  of  this  exercise come  the input  demand  functions  w(z')  and  x(zg) and  the  indirect per
hectare profit y(zg) =  (p-z0)g(x(z'),w(z9))-rx(z'),  where p  and r are suppressed as arguments
for notational convenience.  As in the other two cases, the per hectare profit is the same for all
farmers and the income profile associated with z'  is y(z')Lk,  which is proportional  to the land
profile.  Again income inequality is independent of water charges.
5.4.  Tiered pricing
Here  water rates vary with the total amount of water consumed.  Consider  a dual rate
system with a rate of $z1/m3 for the first Q m'  and $z2/m3 (z 1 <  Z2)  thereafter.  Implementing
this pricing method requires specifying how the first (cheaper) Q m3 are to be allocated.  Two
possible  scenarios are considered:  (a) an equal amount of Q/n m 3 is available to each fanner;
(b) an amount of Q2.j, proportional to farm size, is available to farner  i, i= 1,2,...  ,n.
At a price of $z,/m3, farmer i's  demand for water is L1q(zl) (see (3.1) for the definition
of q(z)).  But the amount supplied at this price  is limited by Q/n or (Lj/! L)Q/n under  scenario
(a) or (b), respectively, where  pLL =  L  n  is the mean farm size.  If the cheap water quota
is not binding (for any farmer),  which happens when Q is sufficiently large,  the situation is the
same as that of volumetric pricing with a single rate considered above.
Suppose  the quotas  are  binding  for  some  farmers.  Consider  scenario  (b)  first.  A
binding constraint  for farmer i means that L1q(zl)  >  XiQ  =  QLi/L or q(zl)  >  Q/L.  Thus, if
the  quota  is  binding  for  one  farmer  it  is  binding  for  all.  Define  ca =  (Q/L)/q(zl);  this
parameter,  which lies between zero and one,  represents, for each farmer,  the fraction of land
that can be irrigated by the cheap water allotted to him.  The remaining part,  (1-cc)Li, can be
irrigated by the expensive water,  for which the per hectare demand is q(z2).  Farmer  i's  per
hectare  demand for water is,  on  average,  caq(zj)+(1-cx)q(z 2),  and the associated per  hectare
profit  is  y(z1,z2)  =  f(xq(zj)+(1-ot)q(z 2))  - z,ctq(zj) - z2(1-c)q(z2).  Farmer  i's  income  is
y(zt,z2)Lj  and the group  income profile  is y(zl,z2)LX.  As  in the above three  methods,  the29
income  profile  is  proportional  to  the  land  endowment  profile,  hence  income  inequality  is
determined solely by farm size inequality.  independent of the water rates z, and z2.
The  situation is different under  scenario  (a),  where farmers get an equal  share  of the
cheaper  water.  To see this,  consider the case where n=2  (two farrmers), L=1,  XI=0.25  and
X2=0.75.  Suppose further that q(zl)=4  and  Q=2.  Farmer  l's  demand of the cheaper  water
is  klq(z1)  =  0.25x4  =  1,  which  is  fully  met  by  his  Q/n =  1  m 3 allotment.  Farmer  2's
demand of the cheaper water is 0.75x4  3,  which exceeds his 1 m3 allotment.  If  Z 2 >  f(1).
farmer 2 will not demand water priced at $z1/m3 and will prefer to leave some of his land idle.
The  result  is that  both farmers  will  have  identical  incomes.  The equal  allocation  of  the
cheaper water has led to an egalitarian income distribution.
In general,  a tiered pricing  system coupled with equal allocation of the cheaper  water
leads to an income profile which is more egalitarian (in the sense of admitting lower inequality
measures)  than income profiles which are proportional  to the land distribution profile  X.  This
can be verified by showing that the income profile  of the tiered svstem can be  accepted from
an income profile of a single rate by transferring  income from  larger farms to smaller  ones.
Now,  the income profile associated with a single water rate has been shown to be proportional
to  the land distribution  profile,  and  a redistribution  of  income from  richer  (larger  farm)  to
poorer  (smaller farm) decreases the inequality measures.
5.5.  Summary of the equity  analysis
When  farmers  are  per  hectare  identical  in  production.  we  find  that  neither  the
volumetric,  nor  the per  area,  output  or  input  pricing  methods have any  effect  on  income
inequality:  the descriptive inequality measures  C,  H,  T,  A and G depend solely on  the land
distribution  profile X.  This property holds  for most pricing schemes that involve no quantity
regulations.  Trying  to  improve  income  inequality  via water pricing policies  by  using  such
pricing  methods is doomed to  fail.  In  the  absence  of capital cost recovery  considerations,
water rates may as well be set so as to attain efficiency (see Section 3).
Quantity regulation may not always affect  income inequality.  A tiered pricing  method
combined  with  water  quotas  that  are proportional  to farm  size  has  no  effect  on  income
inequality.  On the other hand,  a  tiered  pricing  method  combined with  equal  (per  farmer)
water quotas generates an income profile  which  is more egalitarian than income profiles  that
are proportional to the land distribution profile.30
6.  Numerical  Example
We  present  here a  numerical  example  to  evaluate  the performance  of  some  of  the
pricing  schemes discussed above,  regarding  efficiency  of  water allocation.  We consider  a
representative  farm of 4 hectares (1 hectares  =  2.47 acres) with a surface water quota of  1000
acre  inches  (or  102800 cubic meter).  Two  crops,  cotton and  wheat that  require  water and
nitrogen,  are considered.  Nitrogen can be purchased  in the market; water is provided  by a
water agency.  Other inputs are assumed fixed.  The farmer's  decision problem is as described
in Section 3.
We use quadratic approximation for  the  per-hectare  production functions,  gj(q,x)  =
+xj+jq+yjx+6jqq 2 +jx 2 +ijqx,  j  =  cotton  or  wheat,  with  the parameter  estimates of Hexem
and Heady  (1978)
Table 3: Parameter estimates of the quadratic production functions for Cotton and Wheat
are taken from Hexem and Heady (1978).  Yield is measured in Lb/acre*
Coefficient  Cotton  Wheat
Intercept:  a  233.71  -10414
Water (acre-inch): ,B  23.65  852.01
Nitrogen (Lb/acre): y  0.438  11.6
Water*Water:  3  -0.182  -12.9
Nitrogen*Nitrogen:  0  -0.0033  -0.032
Water*Nitrogen:  q  0.0209  0.0925
Range of water input  8-40  0-40
Experimental range of nitogen input  j 0-120  0-200
* Metric  conversion:  1 acre-inch =  102.8 cubic  meter;  1 Lb =  2.24 Kg;  1 Lb/acre  =  1.102
Kg/hectare.31
Cost of Production  and crop  prices, using the state of Hariana  in India as an example, were
taken from  GOI (1993) and are presented in Table 4.  Prices  are in constant 1993 $US (31.5
Rs =  1 $US).
Table 4: Production costs for Cotton and Wheat
._______________________________  Cotton  Wheat
Output price  $.8/Lb ($1750/ton)  $.15/Lb ($300/ton)
Nitrogen price  $.089/Lb ($.199/Kg)  $.089/Lb ($.199/Kg)
Costs unrelated to water or nitrogen  $78.5/acre ($196.3/ha)  $45.  1/acre ($112.7/ha)
The marginal cost of water supply can be approximated from water charges to industry;
these range between Rs6O and Rs500 per thousand cubic meter (equivalent to $0.195-1.633 per
acre-inch or  $0.0019-0.158/cubic  meter).  A water fee of $.653 per  acre-inch is widely used
(World Bank,  1994) and is adopted here as the marginal cost of water supply.
The farmer chooses the cropping pattern and allocates inputs to each crop subject to the
land and water constraints,  taking all prices and water charges parametrically (see Section 3).
The  water  agency chooses  the  pricing  scheme  and  the  water  rates.  We shall consider the
volumetric  (marginal  cost) pricing,  per unit area  pricing,  tax  on input,  and tax on  output.
Some of these pricing schemes differentiate between crops.
Results are presented in Table 5.  In some cases, the water charges are determined such
that the proceeds of the water supplier are equal to those collected under volumetric (marginal
cost) pricing.  This was achieved by solving:  NMin.r  {7t(zw)_7C(z T)}  subject to profit maximizing
behavior of farmers,  where 7c(zw)  is the water agency revenue under the marginal cost pricing
rule and 7r(zT),  T=g,x,a,  is the agency proceeds under the other schemes.
Following Howitt and Vaux (1994), the marginal cost of water supply is represented by
MC(Q) =  115 +  0.000671.Q,32
where MC is S/acre-inch and Q, the quantity of water, is measured in acre-inches.  The
cost  of  supplying  Q  acre-inch  of  water  is  thus  115*Q  +  0.000671Q 2 -/2.  The  results  are
presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Results of the efficiency performance of the various pricing schemes (10 ha farm)
Pricing Scheme  Water Fee  Crop*  Applied Applied  Farrm's  Water  Cost of  Social
C = Cotton  Water  Nitroge  Profit  Proceeds  Water  Gains
W = Wheat  Supply
m3/ha  Kg/ha  $  $  $  $
None  0  Cotton 3449.6  348.19  9327.73  0  325.81  9001.98
Volumetric $/m3 0.00617  Cotton  3338.7  338.77  8809.87  509.40  308.15  9011.12
Land $/ha  127.5  CW  Cotton  3449.6  348.19  8817.73  510  325.81  9001.92
Land  500 C  Wheat  1406.2  246.51  7343.66  0  77.13  7266.53
Land  500 CW  Cotton  3449.6  348.19  7327.73  2000  325.81  9001.92
Nitrogen $/Kg  58 CW  Cotton  3305.8  281.02  8594.82  654.66  303.10  8946.38
Nitrogen  42 CW  Cotton  3344.5  299.1  8776.75  509.19  309.07  8976.87
Output %  11 C  Cotton  3443.5  345.34  8184.91  1142.67  324.82  9002.76
Output  12 C  Wheat  1406.2  246.51  7343.66  0  77.13  7266.53
Output  4.9  C  Cotton  3447.1  347.0  8818.62  509.08  325.4  9002.23
Output  12 CW  Cotton  3442.9  345.05  8081.03  1246.54  324.72  9002.85
*As explained in Section  3, one crop occupies all available land.33
The results in Table 5 suggest that the model is sensitive to the water procong  scheme.
In the simple case analyzed here, only water was considered as a limited factor of production.
The model as well could have included other inputs such as labor,  credit,  etc...  As a result,
the  various  solutions  in the  table  suggest  only  one  crop  (Corner  solutions),  while  if  more
constraints  would have been effective,  the optimal  solution could have  more than  one  crop
grown.  Farm's  profit  was  calculated directly  in  the objective  function  that  was  aimed  at
maximizing  farm's  profit.  Water proceeds were  calculated according to  the pricing  scheme
used,  and cost of water supply was calculated based on the cost equation  in the text.  Social
gains were then calculated as the sum of the farm profit and water proceeds minus the cost of
water supply.
The results  of the nuerical analysis rely on the crops and  the functional  forms of the
production  function  selected for  the  analysis.  Therefore,  the  reaults  should  be  viewed  as
indicative in nature.  However,  the results of the analysis rank the various procong schemes in
an ordinal  order  that reflects  their reative  efficiency with regard  to  the volumetric  marginal
cost procong scheme.
As expected,  the volumetric pricing  is superior,  in terms of  social gains,  to  all  other
schemes.  Also,  both  the  input  (nitrogen)  and  output  pricing  schemes,  when  optimally
selected, outperform  the per unit area pricing method.  This is as expected because the input
and  output pricing  can achieve  second best  efficiency  (see Section  3)  whereas  the  latter  is
inefficient.  It  can be  seen also  from  the example that their  are ranges  that  the output,  the
input, and  the per  area schemes are not very responsive  (in the social gains) to different  tax
levels,  but  do  response  in  terms  of  water  application.  Although  not  significant  in  this
particular  example,  this effect should be taken into consideration for policy purposes since it
may be preferred  in situations where water is very scarce, and agricultural  activities are very
rigid.
The example,  however,  ignores monitoring  and enforcement  costs,  and  per  unit area
pricing undoubtedly requires the least of such costs.  Thus, when transaction (agency) costs are
included,  the ranking may change.
If  the water agency  is interested  in cost recovery,  it can achieve that by  appropriate
selection of the water rates.  A $200/ha land tax provides the agency with the same proceeds
collected by using the volumetric scheme, though far from the same efficiency.  A nitrogen tax
of $42/Lb and a yield tax of 4.9%,  both achieve the same level of proceeds as in the case of
volumetric pricing.34
7.  Conclusions
Pricing of water may affect allocation considerations by various users.  In this paper we
investigated  efficiency and  equity  performance  of  several  irrigation water  pricing  methods.
Main findings of the study are that,  in general,  efficiency of water use is attainable whenever
the  pricing  method affects  the demand  for  irrigation  water.  The  volumetric,  output, input
tiered and two-part tariff schemes all satisfy this condition and can achieve efficiency, though
the type of efficiency (short or  long  run,  first  or  second best)  vary from  one method to the
other.  These  methods  also  differ  in  the  amount  and  type  of  information,  and  the
administrative  cost  needed in  their  implementation.  Pricing  schemes that do  not  influence
water input directly,  such as per  unit area fee,  lead to inefficient allocation.  Such methods,
however,  are in general easier to implement and  administer and they require a modest amount
of information.
Concerning equity performance,  the conclusion is that the extent to which water pricing
methods  can affect  income redistribution  is rather  limited.  Farm  income disparities  are due
mainly  to  such factors as farm size and location,  and soil quality,  but  not to water (or other
input) prices.  We found that when  farmers are per-hectare  identical in production,  which is
the assumption used in this study,  face the same prices, and not affected by quantity quotas on
inputs  or  outputs,  the  income  distribution  profile  under  most  water  pricing  methods  is
proportional  to the initial farm size distribution  profile.  Since measures of income inequality
(with  the  exception  of  the  variance)  are  not  sensitive  to  proportional  shifts  in  income,
inequality is due solely to the farm size inequality and is independent of the pricing method or
water rates used.  For a water pricing  scheme to influence income distribution,  it must involve
certain quantity quota rules.
These conclusions lend  some  support  to  the view  that  income redistribution  policies
should not be carried out via water prices (see,  e.g.,  Seagraves and Easter,  1983); not because
it involves  wrong doing  but  because  water  prices  serve as  a poor  means  to  reduce  income
inequality.  However,  pricing  schemes  that  involve  water  quota  rules  can  reduce  income
inequality.  We demonstrate this  with a two  rate tiered pricing scheme combined  with equal
quotas of the cheaper water.35
Appendix: A normative  interpretation  of descriptive  inequality
measures
It is possible to interpret the descriptive  measures V,  C, H, T,  A and G as normnative
measures  corresponding to some underlying  welfare functions (see Sen,  1973, and  Blackorby
and  Donaldson,  1978).  Such  interpretations  reveal  the  implicit  normative  assumptions
associated with using any of the descriptive  statistics, hence can help in choosing armong  them
in any given situation.  This interpretation is carried out as follows.
Consider a linear homogeneous welfare function normalized as
W(1,l,...,1)  =  1
so that
W=  p  and  W(ys,ys,  .YS)  = yS.
Now,  jt  =  AtW(1,1,  ... ,1) (since W(1,  1,...,1)  =  1)
= W(,  pi  ..,p)  (linear homogeneity)
- W(y 1,y2,. .,yn)  (quasi concavity)
so  p  is the maximum level of W(y).  Noting  the definition of N,  it is readily  verified
that the N measure corresponding to the group welfare function
Wi(y) =  A04-(y))
is the same as I, I=V,C,H,T,G.
For  example,  the  group  welfare  functions  associated  with  C,  T,  A  and  G  are,
respectively,3  6
WC  (Y) =  - (Y_  P)/
n
nplog(n/i)  - EYi  og(yi)
WT CY)  j=
nlog(n)
n
W(Y)  F  I/Yin'
and
WG(y)=  - y  +  3y,  +  . +  (2i  - l)yj  +  +  (2n  - I)y,  Yi Y2  2---Yn.
n
This  normative  interpretation  allows  one  to  attach  some  ethical  properties  to  the
descriptive  statistics  (see  Blackorby  and  Donaldson,  1978,  pp.  71-76),  thereby  helps  in
selecting among them.37
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